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ABSTRACT 
 
This study proposes and tests a model delineating relational norms and their relationship with the 
construct Trust and compares the results across two culture groups.  The norms of Solidarity, 
Flexibility, and Mutuality are proposed as precursors to the formation of Trust.  SEM results 
confirm two opposing models for U.S. and Hungarian respondents.  Relational Norms have a 
strong positive relationship with formation of Trust for the Hungarian respondents, acting as a 
precursor of Trust.  Whereas, the relationship between trust and the relational norms is weak for 
the U.S. respondents, and indicates that Trust is a precursor to the formation of Relational Norms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he activities that take place between firms involved in buyer-seller transactions can be described 
according to the level of involvement required by the two parties.  Relationship marketing 
concentrates on the relational aspects of exchange as opposed to purely contractual short-term profit 
based exchange transactions, the point of which is the realization of higher profits over the extent of the relationship.   
 
Trust is an important element in defining the strength of relationships and is essential to sustaining long-
term relationships.  The interaction of two firms will occur and continue only if each perceives the relationship as an 
attractive one (Hallen et al. 1991).  Trust and power are two mechanisms that allow firms to interact.  The 
relationship process evolves over time as the actors mutually and sequentially demonstrate their trustworthiness 
(Hallen et al. 1991).  Trust in equal status relationships is equivalent to subordination (Bond and Forgas, 1984).  In 
those relationships where power cannot ascertain that behavior will be appropriate, trust is what takes its place and 
allows the relationship to function.    
 
In cross-cultural relationships, the establishment of trust can be difficult.   
 
The acts of trust may differ from culture to culture; the need for the guarantee of trustworthiness will be invariant, 
(Bond & Forgas 1984 p. 348). 
 
This study proposes and tests a model delineating relational norms and their relationship with the formation 
of Trust and compares the results across two cultural groups.  The norms of Solidarity, Flexibility and Mutuality are 
proposed as precursors to the formation of Trust.   
 
 
T 
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THE RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) presented a framework that places exchange relationships on a continuum 
from discrete transactions to relational exchange.  This process consists of four phases: Awareness, Exploration, 
Expansion, and Commitment, resulting in a set of shared values and governance structures between the two parties.  
Several sub-processes occur to deepen the dependence of the two parties and move the developing relationship from 
one phase to the next.  One of the sub-processes is norm development.   
 
Norm development occurs in the exploration phase of the relationship and provides guidelines and 
expected patterns of behavior.  Norms of behavior exist within each party prior to any interaction between the two 
parties, and are brought into the relationship. Norms guide perceptions of social exchange and exert powerful 
influences on behavior.  As the two parties interact; new relational norms are developed specific to their shared 
relationship.   
 
Relational Norms 
 
Relational norms are a higher order construct consisting of multiple dimensions.  These dimensions explore 
the strength, or interconnectedness, of the relationship and include measures of Relational Focus, Solidarity, 
Restraint, Role Integrity, Conflict Resolution, Flexibility, Mutuality, And Information Exchange (Heide and John 
1990, 1992; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Dant and Schul 1992; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Dwyer, Schurr, 
and Oh 1987; Frazier, Spekman, and O‟Neil 1988).  The development of relational norms results in the building of 
trust between the two organizations. 
 
PROPOSED MODEL FOR TESTING 
 
Based upon Morgan and Hunt (1994), and Hunt, Lamb, and Wittman‟s (2002) conceptualization of the 
relationship, shared values are a precursor to trust in the relationship.  Shared values according to Dwyer, Schurr, 
and Oh, are relational norms (shared values specific to the relationship), and will be operationalized as Relational 
Norms (Solidarity, Flexibility, and Mutuality) in this study.   
 
Solidarity is the extent to which the interfirm interaction is seen as focusing on preserving an ongoing relationship 
(McNeil 1981; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Dant and Schul 1992; Heidi and John 1992).  Flexibility captures the 
degree to which change could occur in the contracts between parties so that they conform to changes in the 
environment.  Change must either be envisioned and permitted within the existing relationship, (relationship 
exchange), or it must be possible for the outdated transactional specifications to be terminated, and new, appropriate 
ones created (discrete transacting) (MacNeil 1981; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Heidi and John 1992).   Mutuality 
implies the requirement of a positive incentive to exchange for both parties.  Under discrete governance, the parties 
require positive outcomes from each discrete transaction and envision the monitoring of each transaction as if it 
were the last, and therefore only event capable of delivering the desired outcomes. Under relational exchange, the 
parties expect generalized reciprocity emanating from the ongoing and indeterminate relationships, (MacNeil 1981; 
Kaufmann and Dant 1992).  Trust exists when one party has confidence in an exchange partner‟s reliability and 
integrity (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993).  The model to be tested is depicted in 
Figure 1, and focuses upon the relational norm constructs developed by Kaufman and Dant (1992) and their 
relationship with the construct Trust.    
 
SAMPLE  
 
Culture groups were chosen to represent a „mature‟ and a „transitional‟ economy.  American managers 
were chosen based upon accessibility, and represent the culture of a mature economy.  Hungarian managers were 
chosen to represent a transitional economy.   
 
 For the Hungarian respondents, the survey instrument was carefully translated into Magyari from the 
English version.  Care was taken that a simplistic, straight translation would not result; instead, careful matching of 
the intended situation and its relevance to business as well as the common understanding and usage of specific 
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terminology was taken into consideration.  This translation was then compared to the original English version by 
Budapest University of Economic Sciences (BUES) professors fluent in both languages and any discrepancy was 
handled by consensus of a team.  Finally, several Hungarian business managers were interviewed using the Magyari 
translation in order to assess the variation of the responses from the expected norm.    
 
 
 
 
 
HUNGARIAN MANAGERS 
 
 The Szuv database was utilized for a sampling frame.  The database attempts to provide a census of firms 
in Hungary.  A sample was selected through a random process that included partitioning of the database to ensure a 
representative sample by industry and firm size (number of employees).  Firms with 50 or more employees were 
selected in order to ensure that a manager could be identified in the firm that supervised a number of employees.    
 
A total of 230 firms were contacted.  Twenty-eight firms refused to participate.  Two-hundred and two 
questionnaires were completed for an 88% response rate.  Each questionnaire was checked for completion.  Random 
phone calls were made to managers who participated in the study to confirm that they personally met with the 
student and completed the questionnaire, and all resulted in affirmation, authenticating the data collection. The 
Hungarian managers that comprise the respondent pool hold a variety of mid- and upper-managerial positions in the 
firm they represent.   
 
 
 
F1 
solidarity 
F2 
flexibility 
F3 
mutuality 
F4 trust 
Solidarity  
We are committed to preserving a good working relationship 
We consider them to be our business partner 
We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship 
 Flexibility 
We would willingly make adjustments to help them out when faced  
 with  special problems or circumstances 
We would gladly set aside the contractual terms in order to work  
 through difficult situations 
Mutuality 
Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given  
    time period, they balance out over time 
We each benefit  and earn in proportion to the efforts we put in. 
We do not mind owing each other favors 
Trust 
We expect a strong spirit of fairness to exist in our  
   exchange relationships 
If the other party has information that would help our  
   business, then the other party should provide that 
information 
A very high level of trust is expected between the two 
parties 
Figure 1: Relationship Model and Constructs 
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U.S. MANAGERS 
 
 A random sample of U.S. firms with employee size greater than fifty was purchased as a database.  Two-
hundred ninety-seven firms were contacted, with 227 agreeing to participate in the research, 46 refusals, and an 
additional 24 firms never agreeing or disagreeing by never returning messages.  One-hundred forty-six firms, who 
had agreed to participate, returned a completed survey, resulting in a 64% response rate.  The two samples are 
similar on a variety of demographic descriptors (See Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1: Hungarian and U.S. Respondents. 
  Gender Age Education Level 
    Level  
             No.     % Category    No.       % Completed                No.       % 
        
Hungarian Male    132    63.8 24 or less      3         1.5            Technical School         6       2.9 
  Female   75   36.3 25-34 yrs.    44      21.4           College                      30      14.5 
    35-44 yrs.    57      27.7          Undergraduate           57      27.5 
    45-54 yrs.    81      39.3          Graduate degree       114      55.1 
    55 + yrs.     21      10.2           
        
        
U.S. Male    116    81.7          24 or less       0          0 Less than H.S.             2         1.4            
Female   25   17.6 25-34 yrs     10       7.1  
35-44 yrs.    42     30.0  
45-54 yrs.    57     40.7 
55 +  yrs      31      22.1 
High School               11        7.8      
Technical School       11        7.8           
Undergraduate            69      48.9                       
Masters/MBA             45      31.9         
PhD.                             3        2.1          
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The structural equation model (see Figure 1) was tested using Mplus.  The Hungarian data supports the 
theorized model (CFI .920, RMSEA =.080).   The Relational Norm (Solidarity) leads to Mutuality and Flexibility.  
The set of Relational Norms is a strong precursor to Trust via Flexibility (See Figure 2 for depiction of results). 
 
The U.S. data results are in opposition to the theoretical model in regard to the direction of the relationship 
between the relational norm constructs and the construct Trust, (CFI=.952; RMSEA =.075).  Trust in the U.S. model 
is a precursor to the relational norms.   In addition, the relationship is weak (See Figure 3). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Historically, researchers have had weak results when attempting to empirically verify the relationship 
between norm constructs and trust.  Relational Norm measures are relatively untested.  In the model tested, the 
constructs were placed into the model according to their intended loadings from previous research.  The data used in 
this study indicated alternative placement.  In order to ascertain whether the U.S. data‟s opposing results was based 
upon the possible error in the factor loadings, the following adjustments were made to the model and the model was 
re-tested: One item was moved from solidarity to flexibility, and one item was dropped from the model.   
 
RESULTS FOR THE ADJUSTED RELATIONAL NORMS MODEL  
 
The results for the Hungarian data have an increased overall fit from 9.13 to 9.69, and the relational norms 
remain as precursors to trust, (Figure 4).  The U.S. adjusted relational norms model also increased its fit from 9.52 to 
9.62, but it still results in a model where trust is the precursor to relational norms (see Figure 5).   
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RESULTS OF A GROUP ANALYSIS 
 
In order to isolate the relationships between constructs, a group analysis was run.  This forces the item 
loadings on the factors to remain fixed, while allowing path weight to vary by group.    Basic relationships between 
relational norms were the same for both groups (CFI = .935 for the model; RMSEA .052, See Figure 6).  The 
strength of the paths differ for U.S. and Hungarian managers between Mutuality and Flexibility, and in one case 
Solidarity.  Trust has a weak relationship with any relational norm construct for U.S. managers, but a very strong 
relationship for Hungarian managers and Solidarity.  When the paths are reversed placing Trust as a precursor to the 
relational norms they strengthen for the U.S. sample and weaken for the Hungarian sample (see Figure 7).   
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
The model was supported by the Hungarian data.  Relational Norms have a strong positive relationship 
with formation of Trust, and are a precursor to it.  
 
The U.S. results do not support the hypothesized model.  The relationship between trust and the relational 
norms is weak, and only exists as a precursor.  Why would trust work as a precursor to measures of relational 
norms?  Several potential explanations exist.  There may be a small yet significant amount of trust required in order 
to allow even the most preliminary firm actions to lead towards forming a relationship.  That is, in the awareness 
and early exploration stages (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh; 1987), there has to be a certain level of trust present or the 
firms would not proceed to spend resources developing the relationship any further.  Trust, as defined by this study, 
was primarily the expectation of fairness in the relationship.   
 
F1 
solidarity 
F2 
flexibility 
F3 
mutuality 
F4 trust 
Solidarity  
.893    We are committed to preserving a good working relationship 
.534   We consider them to be our business partner 
1.000  We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship 
 Flexibility 
1.000    We would willingly make adjustments to help them out when 
faced with  special problems or circumstances 
.549     We would gladly set aside the contractual terms in order to 
work through  difficult situations 
Mutuality 
.550   Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given  
           time period, they balance out over time 
 .724  We each benefit  and earn in proportion to the efforts we put in. 
1.000 We do not mind owing each other favors 
Trust 
1.000   We expect a strong spirit of fairness to exist in our  
   exchange relationships 
.924  If the other party has information that would help our  
   business, then the other party should provide that 
information 
.822   A very high level of trust is expected between the two 
parties 
Hungary   
  
CFI .913 
TLI .913 
Rmsea = .080 
+.82
2 
+.66
1 
+.58
4 
+.82
5 
Figure 2: Original Four Factor Relationship Model using Hungarian Data 
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Figure 3:  Original Four Factor Model with U.S. data 
 
An alternative explanation that builds upon the view that some level of trust is brought into relationship 
formation takes a critical look at the relational norm constructs used in this study. Mutuality is primarily defined 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1992) as the belief that both parties will benefit in proportion to the efforts put in, and that over 
time this benefit will establish balance.  This construct  can be considered a relational norm as well as a relational 
expectation  (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh; 1987) in that the two parties develop this belief over time and that the 
relationship will be positive for both firms (bases upon expected/established trust).    
 
Solidarity, on the other hand, seems to be primarily defined by the view that the other party is viewed as a 
true business partner committed to preserving a good working relationship with conscientious efforts to cooperate.  
This definition is very close to the definition used by Morgan and Hunt (1994) for their main central relationship 
construct of relationship commitment.  This results in taking solidarity out of the role of a relational norm and places 
it in the central position or focus of the relationship.   
 
Finally, the relational norm Flexibility is primarily defined as the willingness to make adjustments and set 
aside contractual terms in the relationship.  This definition could stand to represent the outcome variable of 
cooperation in Morgan and Hunt (1992).  This result would support Morgan and Hunt, and add to the model the 
relational norm of mutuality as a precursor to relationship commitment (Solidarity) and cooperation (Flexibility).  
None of the proposed explanations work for both the Hungarian and the U.S. models. 
 
 
F1 solidarity 
F2 flexibility 
F3 mutuality 
F4 trust 
Solidarity  
1.000    We are committed to preserving a good working relationship 
.956   We consider them to be our business partner 
.846  We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship 
 Flexibility 
1.000    We would willingly make adjustments to help them out when 
faced with special problems or circumstances 
.630     We would gladly set aside the contractual terms in order to work 
through difficult situations 
Mutuality 
1.000   Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given  
    time period, they balance out over time 
.740   We each benefit and earn in proportion to the efforts we put in. 
.760    We do not mind owing each other favors 
trust 
1.000   We expect a strong spirit of fairness to exist in our  
   exchange relationships 
.884   If the other party has information that would help our  
   business, then the other party should provide that 
information 
.819   A very high level of trust is expected between the two 
parties 
+.52
5 
+.19
2 
+.26
3 
+.53
4 
CFI = .952 
TLI= .952 
Rmsea = .075 
  
Chi-Square test of  
Model fit   
  Value = 41.754 
   D.F.  = 23 
   Ratio = 1.815 
NOTE: Fit drops if  
F3/f4 Reversed  
cfi = .940 
NOTE: Fit stays same if 
F4 corr with f3 
.116 
NOTE: Fit stays same if 
F1 corr with f2   .153 
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Figure 4:  Adjusted Four Factor Model with Hungarian data 
 
 
The final explanation surmised is that under certain conditions, trust works as a precursor to relational norm 
development (as there must be some level of trust in order for the relationship formation process to proceed) and 
also as a critical variable that must exist at a certain positive level throughout the relationship, so much so that when 
trust dips below acceptable levels, the relationship can no longer exist.   
 
For example, Trust is a precursor to relational norm development for the U.S., as it must exist before 
expending resources on relationship development.  It is a weak connection, however, because over the course of the 
relationship it is continuously re-tested to assure its existence and strengthened over time.  Under other conditions, 
trust is formed over time, as it either cannot form pre-relationship, or it cannot be assumed due to lack of 
information. 
 
On the other hand, the Hungarian managers are not willing to assume trust when entering a new 
relationship.  Trust is earned through actions and therefore results from the building of relational norms throughout 
the relationship formation process.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The results of this study suggests the need for further research along this stream, even though this study 
utilized data from only one side of the relationship dyad and from a cross-sectional point in time.  It will be 
particularly important in the future to look at dyadic relationships over time in order to fully understand the role 
relational norms and trust play in the relationship.    
F1 
solidarity 
F2 
flexibility 
F3 
mutuality 
F4 trust 
Solidarity  
1.000   r1   We are committed to preserving a good working relationship 
.111 r2   We consider them to be our business partner 
 Flexibility 
1.000    r5 We would willingly make adjustments to help them out when faced with  
       special problems or circumstances 
.646   r4 We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship 
 
Mutuality 
.330    r8 Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given  
    time period, they balance out over time 
.261        r7. When unforeseen circumstances arise, we allow them to suspend the normal operating 
requirements 
1.000  r10   We do not mind owing each other favors 
Trust 
.827   r 20 We expect a strong spirit of fairness to exist in our  
   exchange relationships 
.983  r21   If the other party has information that would help our  
   business, then the other party should provide that information 
1.000   r22 A very high level of trust is expected between the two 
parties 
Hungarian 
  
CFI = .969 
TLI= .955 
Rmsea = .040 
Srmr = .047 
 
Chi-Square test of  
Model fit   
  Value = 41.096 
   D.F.  = 31 
   Ratio = 1.326 
.48
0 
.63
0 
.65
8 
.16
9 
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Figure 5:  Adjusted Four Factor Model with United States data 
 
 
The cultural differences indicated in the results of this research deserve further investigation.   What are the 
conditions for differences in the two data groups?  Differences in cultural values, such as whether trust is earned or 
given, time orientation, or masculinity/femininity, differences in environment, what the risk associated with forming  
the relationship is, power in the relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Hunt, Lamb, and Wittman 2002), or need for 
relationship. 
 
Finally, the roles of governance and power in the relationship should play a key role in the ability to form 
trust.  The U.S. firms are much more likely to assume trust up front in a relationship as they have reduced the risk of 
that trust being broken by relying upon legal obligations contracted into the relationship.  Hungarian managers, 
while less likely to rely upon the legal contracting of obligations in the relationship, would also more often be in the 
weaker power role for most of their foreign relationships (U.S., German, and Japanese firms being the primary 
partners), and therefore would not be in a position to assume trust.  In fact, they may assume just the opposite, only 
forming trust as the relationship proves itself over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1 
solidarity 
F2 
flexibility 
F3 
mutuality 
F4 trust 
Solidarity  
.964   r1   We are committed to preserving a good working relationship 
1.000  r2   We consider them to be our business partner 
 Flexibility 
.872    r5  We would willingly make adjustments to help them out when 
faced with special problems or circumstances 
1.000   r4 We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship 
 
Mutuality 
1.000    r8  Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given  
    time period, they balance out over time 
.598        r7. When unforeseen circumstances arise, we allow them to suspend the normal operating 
requirements 
.942  r10   We do not mind owing each other favors 
Trust 
.588   r 20 We expect a strong spirit of fairness to exist in 
our exchange relationships 
1.000  r21   If the other party has information that would 
help our business, then the other party should provide that 
information 
.955  r22  A very high level of trust is expected between the 
two parties 
U.S. 
  
CFI = .962 
TLI= .944 
Rmsea = .039 
Srmr = .061 
 
Chi-Square test of  
Model fit   
  Value = 37.970 
   D.F.  = 31 
   Ratio = 1.225 
.952 
.085 
.223 
.258 
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Figure 6:  Relationship Model Group Analysis with Relational Norms as precursor to Trust 
 
 
 
 
F1 
solidarity 
F2 
flexibility 
F3 
mutuality 
F4 trust 
Solidarity  
1.000   r1   We are committed to preserving a good working relationship 
.269     r2   We consider them to be our business partner 
 Flexibility 
1.000    r5  We would willingly make adjustments to help them out when faced 
with special problems or circumstances 
.921   r4 We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship 
 
Mutuality 
.819    r8 Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given       
                     time period, they balance out over time 
.563    r7. When unforeseen circumstances arise, we allow them to suspend the  
                    normal operating requirements 
1.000  r10   We do not mind owing each other favors 
Trust 
.800   r 20  We expect a strong spirit of fairness to exist in our  
            exchange relationships 
.997  r21   If the other party has information that would help our  
            business, then the other party should provide that 
information 
1.000   r22  A very high level of trust is expected between the two 
parties 
Hungarian and US  
Group 
  
CFI = .935 
TLI= .915 
Rmsea = .052 
Srmr = .066 
 
Chi-Square test of  
Model fit   
  Value = 100.768 
   D.F.  = 68 
   Ratio = 1.482 
.580 h 
.767 u 
.910 h 
.026 u 
.762 h 
.227 u 
.148 h 
.128 u 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March 2011 Volume 10, Number 3 
100 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
 
Figure 7:  Group Model with Trust as precursor 
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F1 
solidarity 
F2 
flexibility 
F3 
mutuality 
F4 trust 
Solidarity  
1.000   r1   We are committed to preserving a good working relationship 
.313  r2   We consider them to be our business partner 
 Flexibility 
1.000    r5  We would willingly make adjustments to help them out when faced with 
special problems or circumstances 
.886  r4 We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship 
 
Mutuality 
.782   r8  Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given  
    time period, they balance out over time 
.526       r7. When unforeseen circumstances arise, we allow them to suspend the normal operating 
requirements 
1.000  r10   We do not mind owing each other favors 
Trust 
.802   r 20 We expect a strong spirit of fairness to exist in our  
   Exchange relationships 
1.000 r21   If the other party has information that would help our  
   business, then the other party should provide that information 
1.003   r22 A very high level of trust is expected between the two 
parties 
Hungarian and 
US 
Group Model 
  
CFI = .935 
TLI= .914 
Rmsea = .052 
Srmr = .066 
 
Chi-Square test of  
Model fit   
  Value = 100.937 
   D.F.  = 68 
   Ratio = 1.484 
.175 h 
.764 u 
.717 h 
.109 u 
.990 h 
.229 u .183 h 
.282 u 
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